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Nearly half a million Indonesian-Chinese ‘returned’ 
to China in the 1950s and 1960s,  motivated by new 
Chinese nationalism and the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, and by Indonesian 
policies aimed at marginalising ethnic Chinese. 
‘Return’ meant re-embracing Chinese ethnicity, 
culture, and a political decision to join the new 
Chinese nation. However, as Wang Cangbai reveals, 
their journey ‘home’ was to be a painful one. 
Wang Cangbai
RETURN MIGRANTS ARE OFTEN DRIVEN by material consid-
erations such as higher incomes and better career prospects 
at home, but for the nearly half a million Indonesian-Chinese 
– students, petty shopkeepers, traders and labourers – who ‘re-
turned’ to China in the 1950s and 1960s,1 the motivations were 
something else. Their decision was partially motivated by the 
new Chinese nationalism brought about by the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and partially 
due to the Indonesian policies aimed at marginalising ethnic 
Chinese. Most of these returnees were born overseas, including 
many from Peranakan families who have lived in Indonesia for 
generations. To them, ‘return’ meant a re-identifi cation with 
the Chinese ethnicity, re-embracement of the Chinese culture, 
and more importantly, a political decision of joining the new 
Chinese nation. Ironically and tragically, however, their journey 
to China turned out to be painful and traumatic. This was not 
so much because of ill adjustments to the Chinese society on 
their part, but was mainly due to the Chinese state’s refusal to 
recognise them as ‘one of us’. They were turned into an isolated 
group excluded from ‘the People’ (renmin). 
The invention of the Guiqiao category
Shortly after their ‘return’ to China, the Chinese government 
invented an offi  cial category, guiqiao, to refer to the Indonesian-
Chinese and Chinese returnees from other countries. Despite 
the fact that earlier Chinese governments had previously been 
engaged with overseas Chinese and that return migration 
had certainly taken place before, it was the fi rst time that the 
Chinese government created an offi  cial defi nition for returnees. 
In the past, returnees were lumped together with overseas 
Chinese and were generally referred to as huaqiao or qiaomin, 
both simply mean ‘overseas Chinese’. The word guiqiao, 
as an offi  cial category, fi rst appeared in a 1957 document 
‘Explanations about the Statuses of Overseas Chinese, Families 
of Overseas Chinese, Returned Overseas Chinese and Returned 
Overseas Chinese Students’ (Guanyu huaoqiao, qiaojuan, 
guiqiao, guiqiaoxuesheng shenfen de jieshi), issued by the State 
Commission of Overseas Chinese Aff airs. Guiqiao was used as 
a rather generic term, referring to any overseas Chinese who 
‘returned’ to China regardless of their nationalities, age, time 
of ‘return’ and whether the ‘return’ was voluntary or forced. 
In socialist China, the national body politic was imagined not 
simply in ethnic terms, but also along class lines. The returnees’ 
dubious class backgrounds and connections with the capitalist 
world disqualifi ed them from joining the mainstream part of 
the Chinese nation – the working class ‘People’. They instead 
had to be re-educated and constantly monitored by purposely 
established state apparatus and through specifi cally designed 
qiaowu (overseas Chinese aff airs) policies. An editorial of the 
fl agship newspaper of the State Commission of Overseas 
Chinese Aff airs, Qiaowu Bao (News of Overseas Chinese Aff airs), 
declared in 1958 (no. 9) that:
“Considering the fact that most guiqiao came from capitalist 
countries and were infl uenced by capitalist ideology, they 
must be transformed; as many qiaojuan [family members of 
overseas Chinese or returnees] have been living on remittanc-
es and have never participated in manual labour, they must 
be remolded into working people who will live on their own 
labour; as they [guiqiao and qiaojuan] have relatives overseas, 
they are susceptible to continuous infl uence of capitalist 
thoughts. Therefore, the task of transforming guiqiao and 
qiaojuan will be time consuming and arduous.” 
In Chinese, the word gui (return) means more than a reverse 
movement. It also implies a reconversion of allegiance and 
renewed pledge of obedience, specifi cally to those who had 
previously deviated from the norm, but then came back to 
comply. For example, the words guihua (return and absorb) 
and guishun (return and obey) were used to describe the 
incorporation of ethnic minorities or rebels by the authorities. 
In addition, deep attachment to the home land was tradition-
ally seen as the normal state of life and a respected virtue. For 
instance, the Ming and Qing Courts strictly prohibited their 
subjects from going abroad for most of their reign. Therefore, 
in Chinese tradition, the word qiao (sojourners overseas) has 
negative connotations, and suggests someone who is an 
outcast or untrustworthy. The category guiqiao was purposely 
created by the party-state in order to call for returnees’ loyalty 
to the socialist motherland, and at the same time to enable the 
state to monitor and control the returnees. 
Historical vicissitudes
The relationship between the state and guiqiao has been 
unstable, and has been conditioned by changes in the overall 
political atmosphere. Roughly three stages of development can 
be discerned. In the early 1950s, the Chinese government for-
mulated a set of policies designed specifi cally toward guiqiao. 
The central principle of the policies at this stage was ‘to treat 
[the guiqiao] equally as other Chinese citizens with appropriate 
preferential arrangements’ [yishitongren, shidangzhaogu]. The 
original thoughts of policy makers at that time, especially Liao 
Chengzhi ( ) and Fang Fang ( ) who had overseas 
backgrounds themselves, was to grant guiqiao certain privileges 
in daily life, such as additional rations to purchase luxury 
goods at special shops, in order to facilitate their adaptation 
and to mobilise them to participate in socialist development. 
The relationship between the government and the guiqiao 
decisively deteriorated at the second stage. During the Cultural 
Revolution, many guiqiao were accused of being ‘spies’ or 
‘counter revolutionaries’ and were imprisoned; more were 
attacked for subjugating themselves to foreign forces (chong-
yang meiwai). Guiqiao and even their China-born children were 
refused entry to the army, the Party, any professions that were 
considered vital to state security, or from taking up important 
positions in the state apparatus. The overseas Chinese policies, 
as observed by Fitzgerald, ‘had veered from left to right, and al-
ternated between severity and leniency’. 2 At the third stage, in 
the 1980s, the situation changed again. When China earnestly 
needed foreign investment and technologies for its economic 
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Fig. 1
A group of Indonesian-Chinese in their sixties 
performs an Indonesian folk dance wearing 
traditional Indonesian costumes in Hong Kong 
in 2001. They are celebrating the 50th anniversary 
of the establishment of a Chinese school in 
Palembang, Indonesia. They returned to the 
mainland China in the 1950s and 1960s and 
then re-migrated to Hong Kong in the 1970s. 
Photo courtesy of the author. 
Fig. 3 (above right)
The registration form 
of Zheng Tianren 
(originally from east 
Java), shows that 
he was enrolled in a 
‘preparatory school’ 
in Beijing in 1957. 
Upon arrival in China, 
returned overseas 
Chinese students 
were received by 
qiaowu apparatus 
and were brought to 
special ‘preparatory 




buxi xuexiao). Image 
courtesy of Zheng 
Tianren.
Fig. 2 (above left)
Full of excitement 
in anticipation for 
a new life in China, 
a Peranakan youth 
visits the Tiananmen 
Square in 1953 for 
the fi rst time. 
Photo courtesy of 
Huang Fushun. 
reform, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders suddenly 
found that ‘overseas connection is a good thing’ 3 which could 
be utilised to bridge China with the outside world. Guiqiao once 
again became a positive term. Underlying these dramatic turns 
in the guiqiao policies throughout history has been the state’s 
constant pursuit of ‘national interest’. The guiqiao policies thus 
constitute an integral part of how the Chinese state has imagined 
itself, its relation to the internally diff erentiated population, and 
its relation to the outside world. 
Re-migration
The political categorisation of guiqiao, as a special policy subject, 
has created profound gaps between the returnees and the local 
mainlander Chinese. Whereas discussions about guiqiao in both 
academic and popular publications are dominated by nation-
centric narratives, the real thinking of the returnees themselves 
is far more complicated. Disappointed by their experiences in 
China, more than 250,000 guiqiao left for Hong Kong and Macao 
along with their families in the late 1970s once China loosened its 
control.4 However, even among the guiqiao who stayed in China – 
most of whom were benefi ciaries of the preferential treatment in 
the 1950s and were staying in the cities after receiving university 
education – there is still a strong feeling of estrangement and a 
mentality of sojourning. A survey of Indonesian-Chinese in Beijing 
in 1998 revealed that, among the 359 respondents, over 11 per 
cent said they regretted ‘returning’ and over 29 per cent said 
they would stay in Indonesia if they could choose again.5
Since the 1990s, China has received a new generation of return-
ees. Dubbed haigui, they are mostly mainland Chinese who have 
studied or worked overseas for a period of time. How will they fi t 
in with the new developments in China? It is perhaps too early to 
determine what their relations to the state and the larger society 
will be. However, the guiqiao story forcefully reminds us of the 
role that the party-state has played in shaping the returnees’ life 
of in China. 
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